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Abstract
Both in the Party Charter and in the State Constitution, the Chinese Communist Party claims to represent the Chinese peo-
ple. Instead of treating this claim as mere rhetoric made by the party for propaganda purposes, this article demonstrates
that it indicates a rather significant transition in the party’s understanding of its relationship with the people. Particularly,
roughly about two decades into the Open and Reform policy initiated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the party
made a strategic choice in imagining itself as the representative of the people instead of the revolutionary vanguard. This
change in the language was very remarkable in the post-1949 Chinese history, in the sense that the party no longer con-
siders itself as the facilitator of proletariat revolution, but as the authoritarian representative in the political community. If
representation means “re-presentation”, as in bringing something absent present, this appears to be what the party tries
to do. By embodying the nation, the party tries to represent both the rich and the poor, acting as the arbiter of forever
present discords and conflicts within the society. Clearly, this representation has nothing to do with what people usu-
ally call “democratic” representation. But considering that representation and democracy are conceptually rooted in very
different sources, exploring “authoritarian representation” in contemporary China would enable us to better understand
both China and democratic representation.
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1. Introduction
In today’s China, the Chinese Communist Party (here-
inafter abbreviated to “CCP” or “the Party”) claims to
represent the People. It also claims that it is mandated
by history to represent the nation, in accordance with
the tenets of justice, fairness, harmony, freedom, and
so on. Usually, this claim is treated as mere rhetoric for
propaganda purposes. But considering it from its histori-
cal background, it indicates a rather significant transition
in the party’s understanding of its relationship with the
people. Particularly, roughly about two decades into the
Open and Reform initiated under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping, the party made a strategic choice to imagine
itself as the representative of the people instead of the
revolutionary vanguard. This change in the language was
very remarkable in the post-1949 Chinese history, in the
sense that the party no longer considers itself as the facil-
itator of proletariat revolution, but as the authoritarian
representative in the political community. If representa-
tion means “re-presentation,” as in bringing something
absent present, this appears to be what the party tries
to do. By embodying the nation, the party tries to repre-
sent both the rich and the poor, acting as the arbiter of
forever present discords and conflicts within the society.
Clearly, this representation has nothing to do with what
people usually call “democratic” representation. But rep-
resentation and democracy are conceptually rooted in
very different sources, only coming into alliance in mod-
ern times, as Hannah Pitkin and others have shown. By
shedding light on representation in an “undemocratic”
context, we could better understand regimes such as the
contemporary Chinese Party–State and what makes rep-
resentation “democratic”.
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2. The Representative Turn
Usually, the most important turn in contemporary
Chinese history can be traced to 1978, when right af-
ter the disastrous Cultural Revolution, the Third Plenary
Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP an-
nounced its Open and Reform policy. Under the lead-
ership of Deng Xiaoping, the Party opened the country
to the world and conducted many reforms—especially
economic—within the country. Themassive surge in eco-
nomic development, the so-called “rise of China,” and
the drastic change in the society and people’s lives in
China are all direct results of this policy. So, it is a very
crucial “turn” in every sense of the word. Actually, there
is another turn, and one which is no less important. But
perhaps, because it happened at a much less dramatic
historical juncture, it is not even noticed as a turn. Only
in the light of this second turn, however, can the true po-
litical significance of the Open and Reform policy, which
has been mostly fathomed in economic terms, be prop-
erly understood. On 24 February 2000, on an inspec-
tion tour to Guangdong Province, the then Chinese presi-
dent andGeneral Secretary of the CCP Jiang Zemin stated
the following:
A review of our Party’s 70-plus-year history elicits
an important conclusion: our Party earned the peo-
ple’s support during the historical periods of revolu-
tion, construction and reform because it always rep-
resented the requirements for developing China’s ad-
vanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s
advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the
overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. (Jiang,
2013, pp. 1–2, emphasis mine)
As it turned out, this is not a random “pep talk” spelled
out on an occasional tour. It can be identified as the start
of a well-designed ideological campaign that lasted for
many years and arguably defined Jiang’s presidency (Bo,
2004; Dickson, 2003; Jia, 2004; Kuhn, 2010, pp. 107–109;
Patapan & Wang, 2018; Song, 2005). Two years later,
the “Three Represents” slogan was ratified by the CCP
at the Sixteenth Party Congress and was incorporated
into the revised Party Charter. Another two years later,
in 2004, it was finally enshrined into the newly re-
vised State Constitution and given an official title “The
Important Thought of ‘Three Represents’”, next in line
to Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng
Xiaoping Theory. Although, Jiang’s name is not men-
tioned here, it is undoubtedly one of his most recognized
political legacies in China (Bo, 2004).
No serious China observer would doubt the im-
portance of this “Three Represents” slogan. As many
pointed out, “banners” such as the “Three Represents”,
“Scientific Outlook on Development” and the “China
Dream” are extremely important, offering normative di-
rections and policy initiatives for the nation (Kuhn, 2010,
pp. 107–108; Patapan &Wang, 2018). Particularly, under
the cover of Party building and disciplining required by
the idea of the “Three Represents”, the phrase “the Party
always represented” quickly turned into a normative re-
quirement, whereby “it should always represent”. It was
thus made mandatory for (mostly local) Party officials
to do what they could to promote the general interests
of the People—largely understood in economic terms—
by way of attracting private investment, encouraging for-
eign trade, developing high technologies, etc. In compar-
ison, the “Scientific Outlook on Development” promul-
gated by president Hu Jintao was largely seen as a re-
sponse to the extensive “unscientific” style of economic
growth in the preceding decades. Thus, referring to the
state-society/public-private relationship in the Chinese
case, Dickson comments in an article back in 2003 that
the “Three Represents” slogan signifies the Party’s will-
ingness to allow its ties to the rest of society to weaken
(Dickson, 2003, p. 12). Starting from similar ground, Jia
Hepeng draws a rather contrasting conclusion by saying
that the Party was “in fact, strengthening its orthodox
ideology so as to increase its authority and legitimacy” in
times of fast economic development and social change
(Jia, 2004, p. 261). Similarly, Song opines that this cam-
paign was just another old school ideology game played
by the Party to “reconceptualise reality” in order to solid-
ify its ruling position (Song, 2005, p. 32).
Important and interesting as these observations are,
what they do not capture is that the new language
adopted by the Party actually reflected a new reality in
China. The crucial question to our analysis here is: Why
the Party use the term “representative” instead of the
much more commonly used one—“the vanguard” (xian
feng)? To be sure, the term “vanguard” is still used to-
day, in both the Party Charter and the State Constitution,
denoting the party’s “communist” nature. But ever since
2002, it was put side by sidewith the term “represent” in
the opening paragraph of the Party Charter, which now
states the following:
The Communist Party of China is the vanguard for
the Chinese working class, the Chinese people and
the Chinese nation. It is the core of leadership for
the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics
and represents the development trend of China’s ad-
vanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s
advanced culture and the fundamental interests of
the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.
(CCPS Editors, 2013, p. 363, emphasis mine)
These two sentences, emphasizing two apparently differ-
ent elements—“vanguard” and “represent,”—actually
summarize the Party’s historical evolution. Since its in-
ception, the CCP has revised its Party Charter at every
plenary session of the Party Congress, thus, 19 versions
of the Charter have been created so far. A pattern arises
when we browse through all these versions (see CCPS
Editors, 2013), especially the first sentences that declare
the Party’s structure and aim. The earlier back in timewe
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go, themore the Party characterizes its nature and aim as
“universal.” From 1921 to 1943, the Party explains what
it is up to by asserting its membership of the Communist
International and its role as the vanguard of the “uni-
versal” class. However, in 1945, at the end of the Sino–
Japanese War and the beginning of the Second Chinese
Civil War (1945–1949), it asserted that it was the van-
guard of the “Chinese” working class, speaking for the in-
terests of the Chinese Nation and People. After the Party
won the civil war, the “national” character of the Party
seemed to give way to a more universalistic orientation.
The language in the Party Charter swung back to strong
terms like “vanguard of the working class” and “radical
revolution,” which lasted until the end of the Cultural
Revolution in late 1970s. In the 1982 version of the Party
Charter, the Party started to present itself as one who
“represents” the interests of all nations (or ethnic groups)
in China, while still acting as the “vanguard of the work-
ing class.” Then in 2002, as mentioned above, the “Three
Represents” was promulgated and incorporated into the
Party Charter, with a “representation” narrative seeming
to overtake the narrative of the “vanguard”.
In history, of course, the term “vanguard party”
deals essentially with Vladimir Lenin’s distinction be-
tween a party of reform and a vanguard party of revo-
lution. Capitalism, as Lenin (1969) argued, predisposes
theworkers to the acceptance of socialism; but the prole-
tariat, on its ownor under reformist party leadership, can
only achieve “trade-union consciousness.” A new type of
party is thus needed to imbue the working class with rev-
olutionary consciousness, which led them to combat re-
pressive economic political systems such as tsarism, and
usher forth the transformation of society. In this regard,
as Lenin says, “the role of vanguard fighter can be ful-
filled only by a party that is guided by themost advanced
theory” (Lenin, 1969, p. 26). In this sense, the vanguard
party is both outside and inside the working class as well
as both visible and invisible. That is, it lies outside the
working class and is thus forcefully visible, since it has
to bring consciousness to the working class and effec-
tively bring about revolutions. But at the same time, it is
also inside the working class and “invisible” in the sense
that the party’s aim is not really to rule society, but to let
the people (or the working class) be aware of their own
historical mission and be able to rule themselves. If this
is the “classical” sense of political representation in the
Leninist tradition, apparently, the CCP distanced itself
from it by shifting from “vanguard” to “representation.”
In this context, “representation” means very differ-
ent things. We can say that a portrait represents the per-
son portrayed, or an actor on stage in a Shakespearian
play represents Hamlet. But it makes no sense to say
that a portrait acts as the vanguard of the person por-
trayed, or that an actor is the vanguard of the role
he/she plays. Hannah Pitkin gives a general definition
to representation by saying that it literally means re-
presentation—“the making present in some sense of
something which is nevertheless not present literally or
in fact” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 9). But both “vanguard” and
“representation” in the CCP’s language seem to contain
some of this definition. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was help-
ful in this regard when he charges that representation
is by nature a “feudal” institution, distinct from the peo-
ple’s rule (Rousseau, 2002, pp. 211–212). In his under-
standing, political representation—in whatever form—
inevitably sets the representatives apart from the rep-
resented (the people), and places the former above the
latter. Hence, his uncharitable comment that the English
nation is only free “during the election of members of
Parliament; as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved and
counts for nothing” (Rousseau, 2002, p. 211). However
idiosyncratic this Rousseauian definition may seem to-
day, we believe it succinctly summarizes the practice
of political representation as a form of ruling, a point
that could easily be drowned out by people’s equation
of representation and democracy in today’s language.
Therefore, from this Rousseauian perspective, Leninist
revolutionary vanguard would not be a form of represen-
tation because the intention of vanguard is not exactly
to rule the society, but to transform it through revolu-
tion. Furthermore, we venture to say that the sense of
representation contained in the “Three Represents” tilts
towards this Rousseauian definition of political represen-
tation and is largely different from the vanguard idea.
The meaning of the CCP’s turn from vanguard to
representative becomes much clearer when we go back
to the moment when the Party spelled out the “Three
Represents.” Around the year 2000, two decades into the
Open and Reform era, the form and composition of soci-
ety have changed rapidly. Before the 1980s, society was
governed and structured using Marxist egalitarian prin-
ciples, and the People were generally poor. Although,
there were inequalities among people during this time,
especially between those in the city and the country-
side, between those who worked for state-owned enter-
prises and those who did not, these can be identified as
largely “bureaucratic” rather than class-based inequali-
ties (Dillon, 2015). As popularly known, the Open and
Reform policy propelled the country onto fast-track eco-
nomic development. This may have been naturally good
for the People, but it poses political challenges to the
Party. For after two decades of growth, the workers and
peasants, whom the Party is supposed to speak for, were
seen at the bottom of the newly emerged social stratifi-
cation, while cadres, quasi-cadres, and “capitalists,” such
as private business owners and entrepreneurs, are bet-
ter off.
As a social phenomenon, this was heavily discussed
by Chinese intellectuals at the time, leading to govern-
ment censorship of some publications (Lu, 2002; Zheng,
2004). This social stratification was confirmed by Li Yi’s
research based on statistical data (Li, 2005). Obviously,
this does not go well with the Party’s image as a prole-
tariat vanguard. The looming question to be asked is: Is
the Party still a communist party or not? If it is, how are
the working class and peasants now found at the bottom
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of the society? After the 1980s, Party theorists worked
very hard to justify the course taken by the Party, mostly
emphasizing the need to combine local Chinese realities
and characteristics with Marxist theories and ideologies
(Choi, 2011). It is no coincidence then, that around this
time, the term “representation” emerged in the Party’s
updated self-portrait of its relationship with the Chinese
People. By representing the People, the Party does not
have to negate any social strata or class. Instead, it me-
diates their potentially conflicting interests, synthesizes
them, and goes beyond them to the level of far-sighted,
overarching “general interests.” By presenting these gen-
eral interests, the Party bringswhat is absent, present—a
literal meaning of “representation”.
Theoretically, of course, the Party could have
switched back to vanguard mode at this historical junc-
ture. But instead, it chose to reassert its authority with-
out alienating the newly emergent “capitalistic” forces.
Although, capitalistic forces are not specifically men-
tioned in the “Three Represents,” it is clear from the
language and corresponding policies that “capitalists”
are no longer seen as the “enemy of the people” who
should be eliminated here and now. In the light of this, af-
ter 2002, the CCP began to open itsmembership to those
who had more commonly been considered as the peo-
ple’s enemy: mostly entrepreneurs and technical person-
nel (Renmin Ribao, 2003). In a speech given at the 80th
anniversary of the Party, President Jiang declared that
they would “join workers, farmers, intellectuals, cadres
and PLA officers and men in an effort to build social-
ism with Chinese characteristics”. Therefore, it became
“necessary to accept those outstanding elements from
other sectors of the society who have subscribed to the
Party’s Programme and the Constitution…and have met
the requirements for the Party’s membership through a
long period of tests” (Jiang, 2013, p. 280). This attests
to the above argument that the Party does want to be
a representative that presents a unified image of the
People. This is not to say that the Party has forsaken its
communist (or vanguard) nature, indeed, this is far from
the truth. Looking at it from both historical and theo-
retical perspectives, there has been a “representative
turn” in contemporary China, one that is in a way even
more significant than the turn made by the Open and
Reform policy.
3. Representation in the People’s Congress
In order to fully explicate the CCP’s representation, there
is need to further put it under a local comparative light
by briefly mentioning the other form of “representa-
tion” in the Chinese political context, one that is more
widely known and talked about, namely, representa-
tion in the People’s Congresses. Indeed, members of
these congresses—both the National People’s Congress
(hereinafter abbreviated as “NPC”) and Local People’s
Congress—are called “representatives of the people”
(ren min dai biao). As the Constitution and the law re-
quire, they have to be elected by the People, and they
do go through electoral processes. As members of leg-
islative bodies, they are supposed to represent the views
and interests of their constituents and review govern-
mental reports, including their budget, law proposals,
policy proposals, and so on. So, in the face of it, they
are not so far away from what political representation
looks like, for instance, in western democratic countries.
But of course, the difference is that these elections are
tightly controlled by Party-led authorities and the repre-
sentatives are largely authorized to sit in congress by the
Party instead of the electorate (Yuan, 2011).
However, it should be noted that, once in congress,
some representatives could act defiantly against the
Party authority and challenge its position on certain ma-
jor issues, as Mr. Huang Shunxing did in 1992 when the
NPC voted for themassive ThreeGorges project proposal.
The controversial project proposal was passed, but not
without a historical record of both objecting and abstain-
ing votes (6.7% voting no, 25.2% abstaining, and 0.09%
not voting). In a later interview, speaking on his motive
for objecting, Mr. Huang said that, as both a representa-
tive of the People and a member of the human commu-
nity, his absolute responsibility was to speak the truth as
he saw it (Huang, 2013). It could be said that, in challeng-
ing the Party’s position, Mr. Huang formed a direct repre-
sentational relationship with the people as a whole, not
primarily by referring to the electoral process that sup-
posedly put him in congress, but by referring to some
“high values”. The Constitution of China, for instance,
specifically states that the NPC is the highest state organ
and has the right and power to elect the president and
oversee the government. This alone should give some
members of the NPC enough sense of honor and duty,
despite the NPC’s de facto status in the political system.
On the other hand, there has been much debate re-
cently on the emergent ability of the People’s Congresses
today to restrain the government’s power, to the ex-
tent that they may inch towards a certain kind of “check
and balance” dynamism (Almén, 2013; Kamo& Takeuchi,
2013; Manion, 2015; Truex, 2016). However, nobody
could yet deny the fact that congresses are not really
independent from the Party. To put the Party-Congress
relationship in context, in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping di-
rected that the Party should no longer substitute itself
for the state—a typical organ of which is the People’s
Congress—but function behind it, providing fundamen-
tal principles and guidelines (Deng, 1994). The purpose
of this, however, was not exactly to put a check on
the Party, but to consolidate the Party’s power on a
largely different basis—which is summarized in this ar-
ticle as “the representative turn.” From our perspective,
the People’s Congress actually participates in the Party’s
representation of the People, rather than forming an
institutional check on it. On the one hand, it is diffi-
cult today to imagine that any law or public policy pro-
posal may enter the NPC, let alone be passed, without
the Party’s initial consent. In other words, the real ulti-
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mate representative claims on the People’s general in-
terests have to be made by the Party. But on the other
hand, it also seems imperative that these claims be for-
mally passed by the NPC and presented as the voice of
the People. This mere process, guaranteed by Deng’s
Principle of Party–State separation, functions to moder-
ate the Party’s power, forcing it to seriously consider the
kinds of proposal it puts through the NPC. This is exactly
why the composition of NPC representatives is so visi-
bly descriptive of the components of Chinese society—
man, woman, workers, farmers, soldiers, cadres, differ-
ent ethnicities, different provinces, Party members and
non-Partymembers, etc. (Yi, 2010, pp. 46–47).When the
NPC annually convenes, the representatives usually put
on outfits that directly depict their supposed identity. By
so doing, the Party solely represents the People, making
exclusive claims on their general interests, with the NPC
forming an integral part of this representation.
4. Representation without Elections
The above analyses have been made with the assump-
tion that political representation is conceptually distinct
from democratic politics, and hence, could be meaning-
fully aligned with authoritarian regimes. This disentan-
glement of political representation and democracy, how-
ever, is hardly something new. In the western tradition,
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s early critique of represen-
tation (Rousseau, 2002, pp. 221–222), to contemporary
reflections on representation and democracy such as
in Hannah Pitkin (2004), many scholars tend to distin-
guish the two, while defending democracy. However, the
thriving of representative democracy in modern times
significantly contributes to the confounding of the two
concepts. David Poltke, for instance, states that repre-
sentation is the same as democracy in an article ti-
tled “Representation is Democracy” (1997). In her article
“Representation andDemocracy: Uneasy Alliance”, Pitkin
characterizes the uneasy relationship between the two:
Like most people even today, I more or less equated
democracy with representation, or at least with rep-
resentative government. It seemed axiomatic that un-
der modern conditions only representation can make
democracy possible. That assumption is not exactly
false, but it is profoundly misleading, in ways that re-
main hidden if one treats it as an axiom and asks only
technical rather than fundamental theoretical ques-
tions. (Pitkin, 2004, p. 336)
Against this background, and given the global domina-
tion of western concepts in political theory discussion
today, perhaps, it is worthwhile to mention Michael
Saward’s contribution in order to clarify where we stand
theoretically in our discussion of political representation
in China.
Saward (2006) criticizes traditional understanding of
representation in representative democracy for largely
taking the represented as an unproblematic given, while
he tries to refocus attention on how representatives
shape or construct the represented bymaking subjective
claims. Both logically and factually, representative claims
could exist outside what people usually understand as
democratic politics. He notably cites the U2 singer and
political activist Bono, who stated: “I represent a lot of
people [in Africa] who have no voice at all….They haven’t
asked me to represent them. It’s cheeky, but I hope
they’re glad I do” (Saward, 2009, p. 1). He did not move
to apply this approach to authoritarian politics, but it ap-
pears to have the potential. However, the problem with
this approach is how to reconcile the subjectivity of rep-
resentative claims with an inevitable demand for “ob-
jective” meanings. While representative claims are cer-
tainly subjective in nature, not all of them are accepted
as truthful in a given society at a certain time.
Saward employs culture to explain this problem. He
argues that culture sets limits or parameters as to the
type of “claims”—or subject–object links—that can plau-
sibly bemade in any given context (Saward, 2006, p. 311).
But he also claims that cultural codes themselves could
somehow be constructed. If that is true, then how could
they function as a stabilizing and restraining force for sub-
jective representative claims? Would not their ability to
function in this way be significantly discounted? It is not
clear from Saward’s texts. While building on his focus on
representative claims, especially their subjective nature,
we tried to give a different explanation to how subjective
representative claims could obtain objective meanings.
We argued that, in any given community—arguably even
in a “global” community—there would be values that are
held as fundamentally true by all—or at least, the vast
majority—of its members. Values such as justice, fair-
ness, harmony and so on are typical ones among them.
But there are also more culturally charged ones, such as
the idea of “Mandate of Heaven” in ancient China. Any
representative claims have to be made with reference to
these values in order to obtain some level of objectivity.
However, representative claims—in whatever forms
they are made—are still always subjective, in the sense
that they can never be completely identified with those
values. In other words, there would always be multiple
ways tomake representative claims on questions such as
“who are the people?”, “what are the people’s best inter-
ests?” This applies to both what we usually call “demo-
cratic representation” and the “authoritarian” type of
political representation. In democratic politics, different
representatives make diverse claims simultaneously and
they competewith each other in an openly and largely or-
derly fashion. Whereas, typical authoritarian representa-
tives always try tomake exclusive claims on, say, the peo-
ple’s best interests; but they still have to refer to common
values in society in order to acquire objectivity for their
claims. This is because there is a relative gap between
authoritarian representatives and common values, they
are exposed to potential critiques or challenges from so-
ciety, thus, allowing a certain level of public deliberation.
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On the other hand, the “vanguard” type of representa-
tion we mentioned above goes beyond this spectrum
of representation, because in there, objectivity of rep-
resentative claims are entirely contained in the Marxist
“historical truth” that is supposed to be imbued into the
people by representatives, rather than the peoples’ com-
mon values being translated by representatives into laws
and policies.
As indicated, when someone in the NPC, such as Mr.
Huang, stands up and challenges the Party’s position,
he/she would most likely point to some “high values”
for which the Party could be criticized, as Huang actu-
ally did. These high values range from the most com-
mon principles of common good, to the Party’s own
mottos, including, “Seek Truth from Facts” (shi shi qiu
shi). This would also include culturally informed ideas
like conscience, historical responsibility, or even the no-
tion of Heaven. Scholars have noticed that dissidents in
China are not necessarily anti-government, as they often
only want to hold the authorities accountable for their
own promises (Schell, 1994). In this sense, they actually
share some overarching values and principles with the
authority. Even for those dissidents who are defiantly
anti-establishment, they cannot be so far removed that
there is nothing in terms of value that they can both lay
claim to. In other words, as is visible in the Chinese case,
dissidents criticized the authorities by offering an alterna-
tive representation of the people, that is, through values
supposedly subscribed to by the community as a whole.
More interestingly, the Party actually does the same
thing in safeguarding its own position in society. If we
pay close attention to the Party’s language, we will no-
tice that, in addition to values and principles such as
justice, harmony, “Seek Truth from Facts” and so on,
there is an almost ubiquitous reference to the role of
“history” in the CCP becoming the (only) ruling party in
China. Indeed, Party leaders and theorists have often
commented that “History has chosen the CCP” (Niu &
Wang, 2016; Zhang, 2017). The Communist Party is then
the ultimate true bearer of history’s mandate; this is be-
cause, in relation to Marxist teachings, it is the only gen-
uine advocate of the Chinese People, and also the key to
the nation’s resurrection after defeat and humiliation in
the hands of exploitive classes and imperialistic forces. In
a sense, we could even say that, in the Party’s language,
the ancient Confucian ideal of the “Mandate of Heaven”
has been replaced by the Mandate of History.
More importantly, in contemporary China, the Party
could be and actually is restricted by these high values, as
seen from the example ofMr. Huang. But there is also evi-
dence from outside the People’s Congress that is equally
important. We have seen many occasions whereby the
Party-led authorities have rectified some major policies
or past courses, arguably on the basis of objections by so-
ciety. The case of the “Re-education through Labor Act”
(also known as Lao Jiao, hereinafter, abbreviated to the
RLA) is perhaps, the most famous and exemplary one.
Put into effect in 1957, the RLA allowed the police depart-
ment to detain persons for minor crimes—such as petty
theft, prostitution, etc.—without trial. Critics, including
those from outside China, had long decried this act as a
typical example of a human rights violation. But largely it
was criticism from within the country—most notably by
legal scholars and NPC representatives—that prepared
the ground for its retraction (Zhou, 2012). For instance, in
2007, Professor Jiang Ping and a further 68 scholars sent
a public letter to the Standing Committee of the NPC and
State Council to petition for the abolition of the RLA.
Among the sources Professor Jiang and others drew
on to make their case, was the state Constitution.
Enacted in 1982, the Constitution clearly indicates that
“No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or
by decision of a people’s procuratorate or by decision of
a people’s court.” If the Constitution is the “fundamental
law of the state” as it claims to be, regulations such as
the RLA are basically unconstitutional. Moreover, schol-
ars also argued that there is a requirement to “construct
a harmonious society of fairness, justice, democracy, and
rule of law” (Ifeng, 2010), one that the central govern-
ment itself has proclaimed to guarantee. In 2013, and
largely against this background, the Third Plenum of the
18th Party Congress announced that this act would be
abolished. Later that year, the Standing Committee of
the NPC passed a motion to formally abolish the RLA.
This case, among others, proves that it is possible
for a kind of deliberation or debate on public matters
to exist, despite the fact that the authority always tries
to prevent alternative representative claims from surfac-
ing in public. However, this is only possible when there
exists a level of truth—composed by common values—
that the authority has to rely on to make representa-
tive claims, but nevertheless, cannot lay exclusive claim
to. The Party makes representative claims by referring
to the values that the society deems true, but it is also
restricted by these values. Indeed, any representative
claims have to be made with reference to these values
in order to acquire a sense of objectivity. But as soon as
these claims are made by particular persons or parties,
they are inevitably detached from those values them-
selves, making them inevitably subjective. As a conse-
quence, representative claims are always subject to crit-
icisms and challenges.
5. Representation: Authoritarian and Democratic
Since common values are what give representative
claims objectivity and values have a lot to dowith culture,
it is worthwhile to discuss representative claims from a
cultural historical perspective, especially since we have
already mentioned the traditional cultural elements in
the CCP’s representative claims. But we argued that cul-
ture and its values do not only “set limits or parameters”
to the type of representative claims that could plausibly
be made in a given community, they also enable peo-
ple in the community to propose various forms of claims.
This is first and foremost clear in pre-modern China.
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In ancient China, as Duan (2014) pointed out, there
was a “Heaven–Ruler–People” relationship involved in
its political dynamism, in which the ruler formed a rela-
tionship with the people by referring to the “Mandate
of Heaven.” In the classic Confucian text,Mencius, for in-
stance, Master Mencius stated that a ruler is a true ruler
not because any other particular person—such as his fa-
ther, the king—gives him the position, but only when he
is ordained by Heaven (Mencius, 2009, p. 103). But how
can Heaven’s will be known? According to Mencius, “It
is through the people that the Heaven’s will is known,”
for “Heaven sees as my people see. Heaven hears as
my people hear” (Mencius, 2009, p. 104). In this rela-
tionship, the ruler derives legitimacy from Heaven and
thus become supreme, so opposing the ruler is tanta-
mount to opposing Heaven. But in this authoritative re-
lationship, while the “Mandate of Heaven” grants the
ruler a supreme position, it also gives room for people to
question his actions. Early classical Confucians even con-
ceived the notion of the Dao, or “Way,” which transcends
any particular authority and to which all forms of hu-
man existence should submit (Yao, 2000, pp. 139–189).
This apparent dualism of authority could indeed facili-
tate a certain level of deliberation on public issues, as the
emperor’s governance always appears to be gauged by
transcendental truth, mostly by those Confucian schol-
ars who deem their raison d’être as being the upholder
of Confucian ideals (He, 2014).
To an extent, the emperor’s power seems to have
been both legitimized and restricted by the level of au-
thentic values, it could perhaps be said that the emperor
“represents” the people, although at that time, neither
“representation” as a political concept nor the idea of
sovereignty of the people existed. Eric Voegelin in his The
New Science of Politics says that “articulation is the con-
dition of representation,” and that “in order to come into
existence, a society must be articulate by producing a
representative that will act on its behalf” (1987, p. 41).
According to this idea, both King of England in ancient
times and the Soviet Union government are such articu-
lators or representatives. In our analysis, this sense of ar-
ticulation could be best understood as representatives’
“translation” of common values into tangible laws and
policies. Moving from ancient to modern times, there
is certainly no doubt that language and social political
conditions are now dramatically different. The CCP is not
claiming that it be sanctified by the “Mandate of Heaven”.
After all, it was born out of the Marxist movement with
a fundamentally hostile attitude toward religious prac-
tices and symbols. Nevertheless, just as it is impossible to
purge all traditional meaning from language, the Party’s
relationship with the People following the “representa-
tive turn” could—or shall we say, must—still be under-
stood in a way that is not so different from what is de-
scribed above.
This also sheds light on the consequences of the re-
jection of those traditional values and henceforth, the
collapse of the “traditional” authoritarian representa-
tion. In China, this happened mostly during the Cultural
Revolution era, when traditional values were considered
as backward and reflective of feudalistic dynastic rule.
They were rejected so that people could be liberated
from feudal shackles and achieve freedom. But nobody
was really free because nobody was able to draw on
those high values to launch criticism or minimal level of
debate with regard to the authority’s decisions. It is only
after the end Cultural Revolution and during the Open
and Reform era that people started to reclaim that rela-
tive freedom to bring up diverse representative claims.
This is not to say the CCP today has stopped trying to
make exclusive representative claims. But the type of
representation embodied in the “Three Represents” im-
plies that alternative representative claims from society
are possible as a result of the independence of those
high values.
This reflection should give us some thought on
modern democratic representation as well. In modern
democracies, representation is often gauged by how
“truthfully” it reflects people’s views and interests. We
are not saying that this is wrong, but it needsmuchmore
clarification than it usually gets. As stated by Saward
(2006), there is perhaps no such thing as “the truthful
interests of the people” to start with. All meaningful ar-
ticulations of the people’s interests are constructed by
representatives who are making claims. There is an un-
deniable and unbridgeable gap between representative
claims on people’s best interests and the people (or their
best interests) themselves. But what is particular about
democratic representation is that this gap is kept insti-
tutionally visible. That is to say, in democratic politics, it
should always be legitimate and normal to propose new
representative claims; and any representative claims em-
bodied in government’s laws and policies are potentially
replaceable by other claims through institutional means.
Whereas in authoritarian politics, the gap is kept insti-
tutionally invisible; it is definitely abnormal for people
to introduce non-official representative claims on their
own. It usually takes extraordinary means—such as peti-
tions and protests—to effectively bring new claims into
the political system. Traditional theories of democracy
and representation tend to draw the line between demo-
cratic and authoritarian politics on the basis that, in the
former, there is “representation” truthful to the people’
interests, while there is no representation at all in the
latter. We differ from this stance by arguing that it is not
the existence of representation, but how representation
is formalized and institutionalized, that distinguishes au-
thoritarian politics from democratic politics.
6. Conclusion
This article delineates the transition from “vanguard” to
“representation” in the CCP’s articulation of its relation-
ship with the people. We take this not as a mere play
in language, but as a reflection of social reality. This
is mostly seen in the true significance of the “Three
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Represents”; but it is also reflected in the Party’s relation-
ship with the People’s Congress. It seems that there is a
significant level of credibility or truth in the CCP’s claim
to represent the people, especially when compared with
its other claim—being the revolutionary vanguard. But
what exactly is this level of truth? Could the CCP be re-
ally understood as the representative of the Chinese peo-
ple? Isn’t “representation” a concept exclusively meant
for democratic politics?
To answer these questions and to better explain
the CCP’s representative claims, we follow Pitkin and
other researchers to disentangle representation and
democracy. But we mainly focus on Michael Saward’s
idea of representative claim, as it points directly to the
constructive nature of political representation without
any regard to democratic institutions such as elections.
Certainly, the CCP’s representation of the Chinese peo-
ple could be understood as a kind of construction com-
posed by “claims,” such as those embodied in the “Three
Represents.” But subjective representative claims need
to acquire at least some objectivity so as to function
in any given context. Saward believes that objectivity
comes from culture; but we argue that it is common val-
ues in a given community that give objectivity to repre-
sentative claims. In other words, representatives make
claims by referring to common values in order to be ac-
cepted as true. But as soon as claims are made, they are
inevitably detached from common values themselves.
This understanding of political representation ap-
plies to both democratic and authoritarian politics, thus,
engendering the distinction between democratic and au-
thoritarian representation.With regard to contemporary
Chinese politics, the CCP’s representation could be un-
derstood in terms of seemingly exclusive representative
claims, which were made with reference to “high values”
in China. Since those values are “common” to the society,
they open way for potential criticism and public debates
from society concerning the authority’s decisions, how-
ever inconstant and scant they may be. This pattern of
political representation is comparable to ancient author-
itarian representation in the “Heaven–Ruler–People” re-
lationship and under the idea of “Mandate of Heaven”;
and it is very different from the “vanguard” kind of repre-
sentation in the Cultural Revolution era. Above all, our fo-
cus on representation does not only serve to unravel one
of the most important notions in contemporary Chinese
politics, a notion that has barely been studied so far. It
also promises a new direction in studying Chinese poli-
tics, especially considering that the field is currently dom-
inated by the “democratic-authoritarian” dichotomy.We
at once break the dichotomy by highlighting representa-
tive claims in both democratic and authoritarian politics,
and redraw the line between the two on how represen-
tation is formalized and institutionalized.
This study also sheds light on modern representative
democracy. Nowadays, people usually tend to believe
that the main problem of democratic politics lies in the
seemingly ineliminable discrepancy between represen-
tatives and the People’s will. This is not exactly wrong,
but it is insufficient in both explaining such complexities
of modern democratic politics as populism, and offer-
ing possible solutions. Our analyses showed that democ-
racy is much more than “letting people speak their own
will” and eliminating the gap between the representa-
tives and the people. In democracies, even in a very small
community with a very limited number of citizens, there
has to be someone who make claims for the best inter-
ests of the people by referring to values that members of
the community could identify with. We argued that the
gap between the representative and the represented ac-
tually lies at the center of modern democracy. Therefore,
it seems that not only can modern democracy not do
away with political representation, but it is critically re-
liant on it in order to preserve a space for open, effec-
tive participation and public deliberation. To square the
circle, if an authoritarian type of political representation
is able to produce public deliberation in a limited public
sphere, political representation is even more critical to
democratic politics.
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